The only comment I made was, "Regardless of whether or not we support this war, you're right, American soldiers deserve the best we can give them."  And I believe that.

I haven't forgotten that, before the Iraqi invasion, before the WTC attack on Sept 11, 2001, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's strongest critics were high-ranking Pentagon officials ... career military officers.  They were bitterly opposed to Rumsfeld's plans to cut funding for the uniformed military while funnelling more defense money to large contractors for the development and production of high-tech weapon systems.

I remember, too, that the invasion of Iraq was intended to demonstrate the correctness of the Rumsfeld doctrine that calls for a blitzkrieg-style air war that would quickly and completely disorganize the enemy's forces and eliminate his ability to mount any form of effective defense.  

There were those in the military who advised the top planners that this would not succeed in Iraq; that more ground forces would be needed, and for far longer than the Pentagon planners thought necessary.  The success of the insurgency, and it's guerrilla-style tactics, have proven those military officers correct.  What happened to those officers?  I offer former Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki as an example of how they were treated.

On Monday, November 29, 2004, Richard Perle told Bill O'Reilly (on the Factor) that "we should have handed the keys to the Iraqis. Instead we embarked on what became an extended occupation. That was not Don Rumsfeld's decision. It was Secretary of State Colin Powell and others who wanted the extended occupation -- we're making real progress. We've already begun to turn the corner."   That statement is the beginning of a campaign to blame outgoing Secretary of State Powell for the horrendous mistakes in Iraq.  It's a lie, too.

Remember that the Powell Doctrine (based largely on the experience and lessons learned in another asymmetric conflict, Vietnam) included these prerequisites for the use of our military abroad: 1) a vital US interest must be at stake (in other words, no unnecessary involvement in foreign wars for "regime change" or humanitarian purposes), 2) the US must commit sufficient resources to win, 3) the objectives (and "exit strategy") must be clearly defined and, 4) all diplomatic options must have been exhausted; the US will go to war only as a last resort.  It is preposterous to believe Perle's claim that Iraq was the fault of Colin Powell.

Donald Rumsfeld has been a huge failure in his cabinet position.  And the ones paying the heaviest price for that failure are our uniformed military and those who love and depend on them.  It's just plain wrong.